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SATISFYING THE DUTY TO BARGAIN" DURING
THE TERM OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO CONDITIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT NOT COVERED BY2 THE AGREEMENT
The stated purpose 3 of the Labor Management Relations Act is to
promote collective bargaining and reduce industrial strife for the
benefit of the public interest. To accomplish this end, the act spe-
cifically provides that both management 4 and labor5 have a duty to
bargain collectively. Collective bargaining includes:
1. A basic premise of Labor Law is that management need not bargain about
those things which are inherently within management's power. These are re-
ferred to as management "functions," "rights" or "prerogatives." "The corporate
or other structure of the business, the size and personnel of the official and super-
visory force, general business practices, the products to be manufactured, the
location of plants, the schedules of production, the methods and processes and
means of manufacturing appear to be such subjects." CCH, 1963 Guidebook To
Labor Relations 268. Determination of the scope of management functions thus
has a direct bearing on management's duty to bargain. Analysis of the scope of
management prerogatives in itself could be the topic of a law review note. See
Nelson, Management Prerogatives and the Work-Rules Controversy, 11 LAB. L. J.
987 (1960). For the purpose of this note, management functions is limited to the
manner in which it is treated in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960), so that the reader may have a clearer understanding of this
note.
In that case the collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration of
"differences ... as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agree-
ment, or... any local trouble of any kind," id. at 576, but excepted matters which
are strictly a function of management. A group of employees filed a grievance
protesting that the employer had violated the agreement by contracting-out to
other firms maintenance work which had in the past been done by company em-
ployees, some of whom were already laid off because of lack of work. The district
court, 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958), upheld the company's contention that the
matter was within the "function of management" clause and declined to compel
arbitration of the grievance. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
agreement did not expressly define contracting-out as a function of management,
and exceptions to a general arbitration clause must be explicit.
In describing "strictly a function of management," Mr.. Justice Douglas said
that it "might be thought to refer to any practice of management in which, under
particular circumstances prescribed by the agreement, it is permitted to indulge."
863 U.S. at 584. It must be interpreted, he continued, "as referring only to that
over which the contract gives management complete control and unfettered discre-
tion." Id. at 584. [Emphasis added.]
This description of management functions is unfair to management. Pre-
sumably, no collective bargaining contract deals either expressly or by necessary
implication with every management prerogative. The Gulf & Warrior case might
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the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession .... 1
Where a collective bargaining agreement exists, to bargain collec-
tively also means that "no party to such contract shall terminate or
modify such contract .... " Moreover, there is no duty to discuss
any such "modification" if it is to take effect before the termination
of the existing contract.8
force companies to bargain even about those functions which in the past were un-
questionably within managements exclusive control simply because they were
not included in the contract which contains a broad grievance clause and a
"general" management functions clause. For explanation of meaning of "broad"
grievance clause and "general" management functions clause see section I, C
infra. This case may do more to disrupt collective bargaining than to foster it.
A fear could be instilled in management of losing its right to manage. An
"open mind" attitude by management might be frustrated when approaching the
negotiating table. Moreover, the depreciation of management's powers might
lead to long and cumbersome agreements creating confusion in interpretation
and application.
2. The phrase "covered by"
includes terms and conditions of employment (1) which are explicitly and
unambiguously spelled out in the contract; or (2) as to which there are
questions of contract interpretation; or (3) which are fixed by the par-
ticularization of a general rule contained in the agreement; or (4) which
must be implied to give the agreement its obvious meaning. Cox & Dunlop,
The Duty to Bargaii Collectively during the Term of an Existing Agree-
ment, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1098 n.3 (1950).
3. It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full
flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and
employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly andpeaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the
legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees
in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce,
to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which
affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the
rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1(b), 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1958) [hereinafter cited as U.S.C.]
4. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. . . ." U.S.C. §
158(a) (5).
5. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer .... " U.S.C. § 158(b)
(3).
6. U.S.C. § 158 (d). [Emphasis added.]
7. U.S.C. § 158(d).
8. [T]he duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/8
DUTY TO BARGAIN
During the term of a contract, the collective bargaining process
is primarily concerned with settling grievances relating to the inter-
pretation and application of the agreement. However, disputes might
arise over matters collateral to the interpretation or application of
the written instrument, which are not "covered by" the contract.9
Until 1949 the question of whether there is a duty to bargain over
terms not covered by the labor contract had never been raised. In two
National Labor Relations Board decisions 0 that year, however, the
following rule was established and is settled law today:
As to the written terms of the contract either party may refuse
to bargain further about them, under the limitations set forth
in... [Section 8 (d)] without committing an unfair labor prac-
tice. With respect to unwritten terms dealing with "wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment," the obligation
remains on both parties to bargain continuously."
The purpose of this note is to illustrate how the parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement can satisfy their statutory duty to bargain
during the term of the agreement relative to subjects not covered
therein. This note will also consider the impact of a strike or a union
slowdown on this duty.
I. SATISFYING THE DUTY TO BARGAIN DURING THE CONTRACT TERM
A. Discussing Subjects at Contract Negotiations
One familiar with the subject of collective bargaining under the
act might assume that neither management nor labor is obligated to
bargain during the term of the contract concerning matters that were
discussed at precontract negotiations but were not incorporated into
the written instrument. Section 8 (d)'s standard relating to this
to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions con-
tained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become
effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the pro-
visions of the contract. U.S.C. § 158(d).
9. See note 2 supra. Typical situations not "covered by" the contract are
as follows: (1) The company has maintained group insurance for its em-
ployees for many years, but no provision has ever been made for it in the labor
contracts between the company and the union. During the current contract the
union submits a request to bargain about changes in the insurance plan. (2)
During the term of the current contract an invention in the industry makes it
desirable from an economic standpoint for the company to make a change in
the manufacturing process, which will displace certain employees. There is
nothing in the contract which specifically provides for the settlement of any
question arising out of such change.
10. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949); Allied Mills,
Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949).
11. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1099-1100 (1949).
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question, however, has met with inconsistent application by the
N.L.R.B. A definite answer, therefore, cannot be easily rendered.
Jacobs Mfg. Co.'2 evinces the Board's first opinion on this issue.
During contract negotiations in 1948, the company and the union
discussed changes in an existing insurance program, agreeing to
increase certain benefits as well as costs. Neither the resulting
changes nor the insurance program itself, however, were incorpo-
rated in the contract. When the union invoked the reopening clause
concerning wages in 1949, it demanded, inter a/i/, that the company
undertake the entire cost of the existing group insurance program.
The company refused to discuss the union's insurance requests.
Pursuant to a union complaint, a majority of the Board upheld the
company's position, thus rejecting an obligation to bargain on this
point. It was concluded as a matter of fact that the subject of group
insurance was "fully discussed" and "consciously explored" during
contract negotiations.
The Board's conclusion is consonant with section 8 (d)'s standard,
which requires the parties to the contract to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith but does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or to make a concession. In subsequent cases, however, the
Board, in deciding whether or not the duty to bargain has been
satisfied, has used phrases like "fully discussed" or "consciously
yielded," establishing a standard that requires something more of the
parties than the statutory minimum.13
12. 94 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1951).
13. Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 976 (1958); Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing
Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958). The Press Co. case illustrates the erroneous result
which occurs when too much emphasis is placed on the extent to which the
parties must go in their discussion of a subject not subsequently incorporated
into the written instrument. The union and the company had been in disagree-
ment over the matter of commissions. The union argued that the subject of
commissions should be included in the bargaining agreement; the company re-
jected the proposal as an invasion of management's prerogative. The parties
eventually agreed at their last precontract bargaining session upon the inclusion
of a clause reading, "there shall be no cuts in basic salary during the term
of this agreement." Id. at 987 n. 16. They agreed that the clause did not encom-
pass the subject of commissions. While the contract was in effect, the company
unilaterally announced that its solicitors would no longer be paid commissions.
The union fied an unfair labor practice charge. The Board held that:
It is well established Board precedent that, although a subject has been
discussed in precontract negotiations and has not been specifically covered
in the resulting contract, the employer violates Section 8 (a) (5) of the
Act if during the contract term he refuses to bargain, or takes unilateral
action with respect to the particular subject, unless it can be said from an
evaluation of the prior negotiations that the matter was "fully discussed"
or "consciously explored" and the union "consciously yielded" or clearly and
unmistakably waived its interest in the matter. Id. at 977-78.
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), International News Se'v. Div. of the
Hearst Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1955) and Tide Water Associated Oil Co.,
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It has been the Board's position'" that a lesser standard would
lead to industrial strife by inhibiting the collective bargaining process.
This approach, however, requires a complete recording of everything
said at the negotiation conferences. Otherwise it would not be possible
to verify full discussion of the subject and conscious yielding by one
party. Moreover, the Board has acknowledged the undesirability of
a word-for-word recordation, when it is necessary for the parties to
express themselves freely.5 Indeed, the Board has interpreted such a
demand as indicative of bad faith bargaining.",
When the subject not covered in the agreement was discussed before
the contract was executed, and the union expressly or impliedly agreed
either not to press the particular point or to withdraw it, the duty to
bargain about that specific subject for the term of the labor contract
has been satisfied. The union has made its bargain. A standard
which requires a finding of conscious yielding or full discussion vio-
lates the plain meaning of the Act. The obligation to bargain "does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession: .. "I
85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949) were cited as the precedent-setting authorities.
It is submitted that these "precedent-setting" authorities were improperly and
erroneously applied to the issue in Press Co. Agreeably, Jacobs held that the
question of insurance had been "fully discussed' and "consciously explored." To be
sure in the INS case, the union "consciously yielded" in the face of the com-
pany's objection and accepted something less than it originally proposed. But
these were findings of fact and not conclusions of law. Therefore, these findings
cannot be considered as establishing some minimum standard for satisfying the
duty to bargain. Tide Water held that the vaguely phrased management rights
clause of the collective bargaining agreement would not support a waiver of
bargaining rights over a retirement allowance plan. There must be a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver, said the Board. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., supra
at 1098. This standard, correctly applied to the interpretation of a contractual
provision, is not pertinent to a situation where precontract discussion of a sub-
ject waives the right to bargain about it during the term of the contract. The
satutory right to bargain is not to be easily avoided by the shrewd pen of a
management lawyer. On the other hand the union should not be allowed to
harass the company with demands to bargain about an issue which has been
discussed at precontract negotiations and, through the give-and-take which
followed, has been omitted from the subsequent integration. The statutory re-
quirement of management in 8(a) (5) and unions in 8(b) (3) to bargain in good
faith is exceeded by establishing the Press Co. standard. This decision posits
that since the parties were not in agreement, the subject was not within the
unilateral control of the company. The Board, under the guise of determining
a waiver or no waiver of right to bargain, is thus in a position to exercise con-
siderable influence on the substantive terms about which the parties contract.
14. Press Co., supra note 13.
15. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 131
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
16. Id. at 854.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
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B. Incorporation of a Wrap-up Clause into the Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Difficulties involved in satisfying the interim duty to bargain by
precontract discussion of terms not subsequently embodied in the
written agreement have led to the incorporation of waiver provisions
in the labor contract.'8 However, as the Board", and the courts2o have
often said, no effect will be given a purported waiver of such right
unless it is expressed in clear and unequivocal language. Contracting
parties, for example, may expressly stipulate that the company has the
right to determine merit increases ;21 that individual bargaining for
terms better than those in the contract is authorized ;22 that contract-
ing-out is within the discretion of management. 23 On the other hand,
waiver of bargaining rights with respect to a particular item does
not by implication waive rights on other bargainable issues.24 Nor
will the Board acknoweldge a purported waiver through a vaguely
phrased management functions clause.25
A dispute concerning a matter not otherwise covered by 20 the collec-
tive bargaining agreement may be obviated, however, by the inclu-
sion of a "wrap-up" clause. The specific purpose of such a clause is
to foreclose bargaining on all matters during the term of the contract
save employee grievances. The following "wrap-up" clause is illustra-
tive:
18. E.g. Borden Co., Maricopa Div., 110 N.L.R.B. 802 (1954); California Port-
land Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952); Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp.,
96 N.L.R.B. 982 (1951); Brunswig Drug Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 451 (1951); Midland
Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 455 (1951); General Controls Co., 88 N.L.R.B.
1341 1950); The Berkline Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 685 (1959).
19. Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 42 (1960); Beacon Piece &
Dyeing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958); Speidel Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 733 (1958);
The Item Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1954); California Portland Cement Co., 101
N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952); Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 982
(1951); Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
20. N.L.R.B. v. The Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955), enforcing, 108
N.L.R.B. 1634; N.L.R.B. v. Trimfit, Inc., 211 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1954), enforcing,
101 N.L.R.B. 706 (1952). N.L.R.B. v. Geigy Co., 211 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1954),
modifying & enforcing, 99 N.L.R.B. 822 (1952).
21. The Item Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1954); General Controls Co., 88
N.L.R.B. 1341 (1950).
22. Midland Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 455 (1951).
23. Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952).
24. N.L.R.B. v. The Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955), enforcing, 108
N.L.R.B. 1634, wherein the court held the union did not waive its statutory right
to insist upon disclosure by the employer of information as to merit increases
granted employees, by contractually committing the prerogative of granting merit
increases solely to the employer's discretion.
25. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
26. Cox & Dunlop, supra note 1.
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DUTY TO BARGAIN
The parties hereto specifically waive any rights which either
may have to bargain with the other during the life of the Agree-
ment between the parties, as heretofore and hereby modified and
extended, on any matter pertaining to rates of pay, hours or other
terms and conditions of employment whether or not covered by
such Agreement.... 27
Subject matter brought about by unanticipated technological change
poses a salient question. Does a "wrap-up" clause foreclose the right
to bargain concerning this subject? Unfortunately this question has
not been litigated before the Board. The discussion in the next sub-
section supports the proposition that the company would be under a
duty to bargain.28
27. Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 982, 986 (1951) (emphasis
added). Similar contract clauses were impliedly recognized by the Board as a
general waiver of bargaining rights. Borden Co., Maricopa Div., 110 N.L.R.B.
802 (1954); Brunswig Drug Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 451 (1951). Since the union
merely charged the company with refusal to bargain over union security in
Brunswig and delivery schedules in Borden, it was not necessary to say more
than that the "wrap-up" clause manifested a clear intention by the parties that
the subjects of union security and delivery schedules should be foreclosed. If
the charge had to do with some other subjects, it appears obvious that the Board
would have similarly interpreted the clause as waiving the parties' rights to
bargain. In fact, in the preliminary report in Borden the hearing examiner
commented that both parties had waived all rights to bargain during the con-
tract term.
California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952) interpreted a
similar contract provision, which reads:
This Labor Agreement and the Pension Agreement together contain
all the obligations of, and restrictions imposed upon, each of the parties
during their respective terms.
It is the intent of the parties by these two agreements to have settled
all issues between them and all collective bargaining obligations for the
term of the Labor Agreement . . . prior to the expiration thereof except
by mutual written consent and except as provided in Section 2 of Article
X of the Pension Agreement. Id. at 1438-39.
The union was held not to have waived its right to information concerning
classifications and salaries of all monthly salaried employees. This opinion,
however, may neither be read as a revocation of the efficacy of a "wrap-up"
clause nor as a restriction on specific waiver. It was found as a matter of fact
that the union needed this information in order to administer the contract
properly. Furthermore, the contract contained provisions requiring the dis-
closure by the company of other information (not including that in issue),
and although the company contended that this gave rise to an implied waiver,
the Board held that the contract was vague on this point. Finally, the contract
clause, which the company argued foreclosed bargaining relative to the informa-
tion desired by the union, did not evince an intent that all matters, whether
covered by the agreement or not, were to be waived.
28. It is one thing to waive rights granted under a statute with respect to
subjects one is presumed to comprehend; an entirely different situation is
presented, however, with respect to a technological invention, bringing change
about which the union could have had no understanding.
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C. Standing on the Contract Grievance Machinery
Most collective bargaining agreements provide a grievance proce-
dure for the settlement of disputes. During the term of the agree-
ment, an offer to follow the contract grievance procedure satisfies the
duty to bargain collectively with respect to a question to which the
contract grievance procedure might apply.29 The Board will dismiss a
complaint charging a violation of the duty to bargain when the ques-
tion of the propriety of the respondent's conduct raises issues sub-
missible to established grievance machinery.80
A question is presented concerning the subjects covered by the
contract grievance procedure. The manner in which the contract
grievance clause is cast determines the answer. The purview of a
grievance clause generally takes two forms; one broad in scope, the
other narrow. The "broad" form is illustrated by the following clause:
Should differences arise between the Company and the Union
or its members employed by the Company as to the meaning and
application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should any
local trouble of any kind arise ... an earnest effort shall be made
to settle such differences immediately in the following man-
ner: ... 31
The "narrow" grievance clause might read, "Any disputes, misunder-
standings, differences or grievances arising between the parties as to
the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this
agreement,... may be submitted to the [grievance machinery]."32
The "narrow" type clause limits grievances to disputes concerning
interpretation and application of the agreement, while controversies
Another and practical problem presented by the "wrap-up" clause involves
potential labor unrest because of the employees' inability to have their pro-
posals represented to the employer at interim bargaining sessions. It is for this
reason that employers who can afford it establish a department within the
business organization specifically responsible for maintaining a good employer-
employee relationship.
29. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 954 (1955); United Tel. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954).
But see Standard Oil Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 227 (1950), remanded, 196 F.2d 892
(6th Cir. 1952); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforce-
ment denied, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
30. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 954 (1955) (employer denied union
right of access to the plant for the purpose of "job analysis"); McDonnell Air-
craft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954) (company unilaterally assigned clerical
work to employees not included in the appropriate contractual unit); Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951) (employer unilaterally changed the con-
tract piece rate in order to compensate for new and improved equipment).
31. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 576 (1960).
[Emphasis added.]
32. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 565 n.1 (1960).
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concerning terms or conditions not "covered by"33 the agreement are
not subject to the grievance procedure. 4 Satisfaction of the statutory
obligation to bargain is now cast in a different mold. The duty is to
bargain at large. 5 Representatives of both parties should meet and
confer on the subject until a solution is found or agreement cannot be
reached after good faith bargaining. Unilateral action by the com-
pany prior to satisfying the duty to bargain is a ground for an unfair
labor practice citation. 6 If the company, however, bargained with
the union in good faith prior to acting, but an agreement could not
be reached, it would have satisfied its statutory duty.37 The statutory
duty is similarly satisfied if the company notifies the union of an
impending change and the union does not seek to negotiate the ques-
tion.
A contract grievance clause cast in broad form subjects any ques-
tion not foreclosed by precontract conference discussions, or by the
contract itself, to the grievance machinery.38 If a contract does not
include contracting-out within its terms, but the grievance clause is
broad in scope, the issue of contracting-out would have to be submitted
to the contract grievance machinery before any other action is taken
by the company in order to satisfy the duty to bargain.
The grievance procedure in many collective bargaining agreements
provides, as a final step, for arbitration of issues not satisfied in
intermediate steps. It might, therefore, be assumed that when the
contract provides for arbitration, the issue must be submitted in order
to satisfy the duty to bargain. Arbitrability, however, does not relate
to satisfying the duty to bargain as closely as it relates to maintaining
or breaching the contract. Refusal to arbitrate, even when it has
been agreed that the particular matter at issue should be subject to
33. See note 2 supra.
34. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 728 (1951); Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 13
Lab. Arb. 189 (1949); Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 11 Lab. Arb. 858 (1948).
35. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
36. N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), reversing 289 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.
1961); N.L.R.B. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); N.L.R.B. v.
Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 387 U.S. 217 (1949); N.L.R.B. v. Proof Co., 242
F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1957); Servette, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 132 (1961); "M" Systems,
Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 527 (1960) ; Laabs, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 374 (1960) ; Oriole Motor
Coach Lines, 114 N.L.R.B. 808 (1955); Armstrong & Hand, Inc., 104 N.L.R.B.
420 (1953); Texas Foundries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952).
37. N.L.R.B. v. United Brass Works, Inc., 287 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1961);
N.L.R.B. v. Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961); Adm. Rul.
SR-1052, 47 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1960); Adm. Rul. SR-939, 47 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1960);
Adm. Rul. SR-114, 44 L.R.R.M. 1541 (1959).
38. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 14 Lab. Arb. 516 (1950); cf. Textron, Inc.
(Esnond Mills), 12 Lab. Arb. 475 (1949).
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arbitration, is not itself violative of the statutory duty to bargain A0
The legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act is
revealing. The bill as originally passed in the Senate, would have
made it an unfair labor practice "to violate the terms of... an agree-
ment to submit a labor dispute to arbitration. 4 0 This proposal,
however, was rejected in conference.
The Senate amendment contained a provision which . would
have made it an unfair labor practice to violate the terms of...
an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration. The con-
ference agreement omits this provision of the Senate amendment.
Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the en-
forcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of
the law and not to the... Board.4 1
IL THE EFFECT OF A STRIKE OR SLOWDOWNS ON THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
A. Strikes
Suppose instead of utilizing the contract grievance machinery
(when the grievance clause is in "broad" form) or bargaining at large,
the union resorts to strike action to compel the company to accede to
demands not "covered by" the contract. Does this constitute a refusal
to bargain by the union? Two cases involving the United Mine Work-
ers of America illustrate this problem. The first 2 case concerned a
dispute over application of seniority in filling newly available jobs.
In the past when new machines requiring different skills had been
installed, it had been the company's policy to upgrade its employees
and train them in operating the new equipment. In this instance,
however, the company hired two men from "outside" rather than
train union employees to operate the machines. The union struck in
retaliation. An unfair labor practice charge was filed by the company
and upheld by the Board. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the order and held that, even if the strike was in
breach of the contract (it was not), that factor, itself, would not
constitute an unfair labor practice.43
The second44 case arose simultaneously. The union struck in reac-
39. United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); Textron Puerto Rico (Tricot
Div.), 107 N.L.R.B. 583 (1953). But see International Union, UMW, 117 N.L.R.B.
1072 (1957), rev'd, 257 F.2d 211 (D. C. Cir. 1958).
40. NATIONAL LABOR REGULATIONS BOARD, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRA, 114 (1948).
41. Id. at 545.
42. International Union, UMW v. N.L.R.B., 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
reversing, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957).
43. Ibid. See 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, op. cit. supra note 36, at
114, 545.
44. International Union, UMW, 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), r'ev'd, 258 F.2d 146
(8th Cir. 1958).
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tion to an arbitration finding that two union employees were not
entitled to shift seniority under the contract. The Board upheld the
company's complaint indicating that the union was attempting to
modify the contract without first complying with the requirements of
section 8 (d). The Eighth Circuit overturned 45 this holding, reason-
ing: "Assuming that a strike against an umpire's decision respecting
... seniority would be a violation of contractual provisions making
such a decision binding, it would not be a strike for the purpose of
modifying the Agreement itself.""
4
These two cases clearly indicate that if the union strikes during
collective bargaining negotiations to gain a favorable position, this
does not relieve the company of its duty to bargain with the union.
It has been held4 7 that a union's strike, even assuming that it vio-
lates a no-strike clause of the labor contract, does not of itself consti-
tute a refusal to bargain. Considering the question from the position
of management, what is the company's obligation in regard to satis-
fying its duty to bargain in this situation? This question was answered
by the Sixth Circuit in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B.48 A
company's promise to negotiate if the breach of contract is repaired,
the men put back to work and grievances filed according to the con-
tract, constitutes an offer reasonably in pursuit of the bargaining
process." The company could also retaliate by shutting down the
plant for a reasonable length of time as a disciplinary measure5 or
refuse to bargain in regard to matters related to the strike for its
duration.5 '
The discussion thus far has been of situations in which the company
has not influenced the strike by unfair labor practices. The parties'
relationship under the act, however, is altered by a strike precipi-
tated by the employer's unfair labor practice. Although section 8 (d)
(4) circumscribes 52 the period during which a union cannot strike, it
45. Local No. 9735, UMW v. N.L.R.B., 258 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1958).
46. Id. at 148-49.
47. Local 2647, Lumber & Sawmill Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 235 (1961); Adm.
Rul. 1080, 35 L.R.R.M. 1450 (1954).
48. 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947), reversing 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946).
49. Id. at 955.
50. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948).
51. United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949); Charles E. Reed & Co., 76
N.L.R.B. 548 (1948).
52. The applicable portion of 8 (d) states:
[Wlhere there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract ... no party to
such a contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party
desiring such termination or modification-... (4) continues in full force
and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and condi-
tions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:
S. . 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958).
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has no application to this kind of retaliatory strike action. The ambit
of section 8 (d) (4) is limited in scope to "economic" strikes in the
area of contract modification or termination.53 The right of employees
to strike in resistance to unfair labor practices is fundamental and
recognized by the statute.5 Otherwise an employer would have an un-
fair advantage. The right to resist such practices would be unequal
between employees working under a collective bargaining agreement
and those who were not and between unions who were satisfied with
the existing contract and those who were not. Such employee disability
would not only undermine primary objectives of the act, but would
be in derogation of its legislative history.5 5 Indeed Congress envi-
sioned the retaliatory strike as a means of inhibiting an employer's
unfair labor practice.
B. Concerted Slowdowns
The act neither specifically prohibits nor approves the use of con-
certed slowdowns and other harassing tactics short of strike to force
the employer's hand during negotiations.5 The Supreme Court in
N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union,57 speaking through Mr.
Justice Brennan, held the use of economic pressure not to be incon-
sistent with the duty of bargaining in good faith, 8 even though the
union's harassing tactics were unprotected under the act.5 9
53. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270 (1956); H. N. Thayer Co.,
99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
55. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947) ; H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1947) ; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1947) ;
93 CONG. REc. 4036, 6385, 6503 (1947). But see, S. Rep. No. 105 (Minority), 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1947).
56. See Local 232, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
245 (1949), wherein the Court concludes that the silence of the federal statute
does not deny the state the power, in governing her internal affairs, to regulate
an activity of this type having an obviously coercive effect.
57. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
58. Id. at 490-91. Accord, Local 220, I.U.E., 127 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1960). The
court in Insurance Agents says: "The presence of economic weapons in reserve,
and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the
system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized." Id. at 489.
The Board had held in three cases that the use of economic pressure was incon-
sistent with the duty to bargain in good faith. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119
N.L.R.B. 768 (1957); International Union, United Mine Workers, 117 N.L.R.B.
1095 (1957), set aside, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Textile Workers Union of
America, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), set aside, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956).
59. Section 7 of the LMRA amendment states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
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Although concerted slowdowns are not necessarily antithetical to
good faith bargaining, neither are such actions within its spirit. In
fact, "an exertion of 'economic pressure' may at the same time be part
of a concerted effort to evade or disrupt a normal course of negotia-
tions.'"60 The majority opinion, however, implies that such economic
pressure is ipso facto consistent with good faith bargaining.
The Court, in Insurance Agents, framed the issue in the following
manner:
(W) hether the Board may find that a union, which confers with
an employer with the desire of reaching agreement on contract
terms, has nevertheless refused to bargain collectively.., solely
and simply because during the negotiations it seeks to put eco-
nomic pressure on the employer to yield to its bargaining de-
mands by sponsoring on-the-job conduct designed to interfere
with the carrying on of the employer's business.6i
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a) (8). 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
For cases in which concerted union activity was not protected under this section
see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956); Textile
Workers Union, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), set aside on other grounds, 227
F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Charles E. Reed & Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 548 (1948).
60. N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 505 (1960) (sepa-
rate opinion of Frankfurter, J., which Harlan and Whittaker, JJ. join).
61. 361 U.S. 477, 479 (1960). (Emphasis added.) When the case was before
the Board, it made the following findings of fact and rulings of law:
In the present case, the Respondent's reliance upon harassing tactics dur-
ing the course of negotiations for the avowed purpose of compelling the
Company to capitulate to its terms is the antithesis of reasoned discussion it
was duty-bound to follow. Indeed, it clearly revealed an unwillingness to
submit its demands to the consideration of the bargaining table where argu-
ment, persuasion and the free interchange of views could take place. In such
circumstances, the fact that the Respondent (union) continued to confer
with the Company and was desirous of concluding an agreement does not
alone establish that it fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good faith, as the
Respondent argues and the Trial Examiner believes. At most, it demon-
strates that the Respondent was prepared to go through the motions of
bargaining while relying upon a campaign of harassing tactics to disrupt the
Company's business to achieve acceptance of its contractual demands. If an
employer in the course of negotiations threatens to shut down his plant or
to cut hours of work or to stop overtime, in order to force a union to accede
to his proposals and abandon its own demands there can be no doubt, under
established Board law as enforced by the courts, that the employer thereby
is not engaging in the genuine good-faith bargaining required by the Act.
Similarly, here, the Respondent's conduct does not evidence an open and fair
mind to reach agreement on the basis of free exchange of ideas which is es-
sential to good-faith bargaining. By the same token, it is unnecessary to
show, as the Respondent urges, that this conduct actually affected the
negotiations or the Company's business. It is sufficient that this conduct
reflected an attitude not to engage in the free give-and-take of good-faith
bargaining. 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 770-71 (1957).
Therefore, in overruling the Board's decision (which was affirmed per curiam by
the D.C. Circuit) the Supreme Court had to find that the union's harassing
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The majority opinion assumes that which is in issue. The question is
whether such activity indicates the absence of an open mind and
sincere desire of reaching agreement on contract terms. 2 Insurance
Agents stands for no more than the principle that union directed
concerted slowdowns and other harassing tactics are not per se viola-
tive of the duty to bargain. Good faith bargaining is a question of
fact to be determined in each case on the totality of the relevant
evidence.8 3
CONCLUSION
Satisfying the duty to bargain during the term of a contract may
be accomplished in several ways. The parties to the contract might
have discussed a particular subject at contract negotiations and failed
to include it in the written agreement. The Board has in a few cases
required something more than mere discussion-a finding of "con-
scious yielding" by one party. In other cases mere discussion at pre-
contract sessions has been deemed adequate. Although language of
the Act supports the latter, final settlement of this issue must await
review by the Supreme Court.
The parties to the labor contract may agree on a "wrap-up" clause
which seeks to foreclose bargaining during the contract term. Such
a device might, however, be unsatisfactory. First, although the wrap-
up clause is legitimate, it is in derogation of the spirit of the LMRA-
to foster collective bargaining. Second, the Board has not decided
whether a wrap-up clause obviates bargaining about a technological
change which affects working conditions. Since the Board requires a
"clear and unequivocal" waiver by contractual stipulation, the logical
result would be that this standard is not satisfied in the specific situa-
tion mentioned. Third, management's invocation of a wrap-up clause
to avoid bargaining might be viewed by the employees as demonstra-
tive of bad faith. This, in turn, could lead to industrial strife.
New subjects arising during the term of the agreement might be
anticipated by the parties and provision made for bargaining through
the grievance-arbitration procedure. The scope of grievance-arbitra-
tion should not, however, be enlarged to the extent that management's
inherent powers are destroyed. Stabilization of relations between
management and unions will not be achieved by Board and court
decisions which take away legitimate management prerogatives.
tactics, as a matter of law, did not manifest the absence of a "free and open
mind," at the bargaining table.
62. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); H. J. Heinz
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
63. N.L.R.B. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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Although there might not be inconsistency between a genuine desire
to come to an agreement and use of economic pressure to obtain the
desired agreement, such action should be closely analyzed in the con-
text of the totality of circumstances to determine whether there has
been good faith bargaining.
No attempt has been made to exhaust the ways in which the duty
to bargain may be satisfied in an interim situation. Ultimately, satis-
faction of the statutory duty is to a large extent restricted only by the
imagination of the contracting parties.
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